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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, zeer gewaardeerde toehoorders,
The obligation of an inaugural lecture imposes a duty to speak to large issues, not
to submit you to a detailed exposition of my latest footnote. The chair for which you
selected me all but compels me to be a spokesperson for the significance of American
history in the larger world of which we all are citizens.
I have spent the past thirty years teaching a course on American historical
thought. Recently, I revised the U.S. Department of State’s Outline of American
History, a short text distributed to schools and teachers outside the United States. I
also have published a history of the American Great Depression with comparative
reference to the two great European powers of the period, Great Britain and
Germany. All of these endeavors have forced me to confront one of the most basic
questions of American history—the problem of “American exceptionalism.”
The idea of America as an exceptional place emerged almost concurrently with
Columbus’s voyages and remains alive today. European discoverers envisioned
America as an Edenic new world, filled with riches and opportunity, a place in which
the virtuous could make a fresh start and build a society free from all the failings of
the Old World. This America was, in the phrase of Thomas Paine, a place to “begin
the world anew.”
By the nineteenth century, however, Europeans—at least much of the intelligent-
sia—would be more prone to see America (specifically the United States) as a land of
blundering, innocent naifs out of touch with the realities of the human condition. A
half-accepting American folklore in turn cultivated a wariness of anything European
as corrupt and devious.
I want to discuss a perennial concern of those who write U.S. history—the pro-
blem of American character and the issue of whether the United States is an excep-
tional nation in sharp contrast to all others, especially the European nations. I will
focus on scholars who have written about this issue at two turning points in
American history when it demanded thought. The first of these was during the initial
onslaught of industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth centu-
ries, the second the decade after the end of World War II. I also will suggest that the
concept of American exceptionalism is two-sided. It involves not only a big generali-
zation about the United States, but also one about “Europe”—a generalization that
requires far more thought than it usually receives on my side of the Atlantic.
I
Nineteenth-century American historians, whether gifted literary amateurs or
Ph.D.-holding professionals, assumed a continuity between seminal “Anglo-Saxon”
(or “Teutonic”) institutions or ideas and American ones. They were usually nationa-
list enough to believe that the American way might amount to a higher development,
but also patrician enough to worry that the United States might be too democratic.
Many important younger historians of the early twentieth century, were more sangui-
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ne about democracy, but often impacted directly or otherwise by Marxian thought.
Positing an economic basis to politics, they tacitly assumed that all industrial societies
were alike and moving in similar directions.
The initial significant dissent from all these assumptions came from Frederick
Jackson Turner, the first major American historian to have been born and raised west
of the Appalachian Mountains. In 1893, at a meeting of the American Historical
Association, Turner delivered a paper that became the most famous article ever writ-
ten by an American historian—“The Significance of the Frontier in American
History.” The presentation came at a dramatic moment. The country was slipping
rapidly into the first truly great depression of its industrial era; labor-management
strife was intense and often violent; desperate farmers demanded a wildly inflated
currency to liquidate their catastrophic debt burdens. The nation was in crisis.
Turner began by noting a report from the Superintendent of the Census—for the first
time in the history of the nation’s decennial population count, a clearly defined “fron-
tier of settlement” no longer existed in the western United States. “This brief official
statement,” Turner declared, “marks the closing of a great historic movement. Up to
our own day American history has been in a large degree the history of the coloniza-
tion of the Great West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession,
and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development.”
Thus he shifted the entire focus of American history. Denying the centrality of the
educated patrician preserving and transmitting a European past, he substituted a dis-
tinctly American type, the restless democratic pioneer.
From the beginning, Turner’s argument captured imaginations. It was all the
more powerful for being only half-developed. Turner made no firm distinction
between “the West” (an ill-defined geographical region) and “the frontier” (a line of
settlement). He eloquently laid out several phases of what might be called a frontier
process: “Stand at Cumberland Gap and watch the procession of civilization marching
single file—the buffalo following the trail to the salt springs, the Indian, the fur trader
and hunter, the cattle-raiser, the pioneer farmer—and the frontier has passed by.”
He crafted romantic prose that James Fennimore Cooper would have envied:
“The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries,
tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him
in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the
hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and
Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long, he has gone to plan-
ting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick, he shouts the war cry and takes the
scalp in orthodox fashion.”
Eventually, Turner admitted, civilization would arrive, “but the outcome is not the old
Europe, not simply the development of Germanic germs . . . . here is a new product
that is American.”
The frontier promoted nationalism, Turner claimed, because its inhabitants looked to
the national government for protection and identity, not to specific states. It also was
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a melting pot that created a composite American nationality. It offered opportunity
for the venturesome and hard-working in the form of “free land,” the availability of
which fostered democracy and provided a “safety valve” for the unsuccessful in
Eastern cities. It fed a national mood of optimism. It promoted individualism. It
gave the American intellect its “striking characteristics” of “coarseness and strength
combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness,” practicality and inventiveness.
Some scholars, often men of patrician descent at Eastern universities, rejected Turner
whole cloth and reasserted the primacy of a Northern European heritage. But, for the
most part, the first two or three generations of Turner’s critics took him seriously.
Some sought to refute important details, such as “free land” and the “safety valve” idea.
Others observed that frontiers elsewhere—nineteenth-century Siberia, for example—
had hardly led to democracy. By the late twentieth-century, however, a group styling
themselves “New Western historians,” products of the radicalism of the 1960s, sought
to demolish less the specifics of the Turner argument than its atmospherics. Turner,
they thought, had created the illusion of a triumphal national advance across the con-
tinent. The reality was misery, oppression, despoliation of the environment, and
genocidal extermination of American Indians. The title of Richard White’s history of
the American West, taken from an old cowboy ballad, said it all: It’s Your Misfortune,
and None of My Own.
A former teacher of mine—a historian of England—often declared: “Turner was not a
historian. Turner was a poet.” The frontier essay possessed its obligatory quota of foot-
notes, but it was not an empirical investigation. It demonstrated instead that well-
expressed speculative essays are the stuff of historical thought. The looseness of Turner’s
prose allowed for the assimilation of many of the criticisms of detail into an expanded
synthesis. It was one thing to amplify a large general idea, quite another to refute it alto-
gether. To their chagrin, the New Western historians discovered that they had simply cal-
led Turner to the attention of a new generation of educated readers, many of whom were
seduced by his prose—and by the intuitive credibility of his argument.
The “frontier” after all began at Jamestown and Plymouth Rock, then progressed for
nearly 300 years across a vast continent. During this time, a “West” always existed
behind that frontier line. This was a movement that involved the migrations and
experiences of tens of millions of Americans; it captured the imaginations of more
tens of millions who stayed behind. How could it have failed to have a defining
impact on the American character?     
Turner also predicted the future. “The frontier has gone,” he declared, “and with its
going has closed the first period of American history.” The second period, he said in
subsequent writings, would display less social mobility and dynamism, more stratifi-
cation, and more class conflict. Having defined the source of American exceptiona-
lism, he forecast its end, predicting an America that would be more like Europe.
Turner was a visionary historian; he was not much of a prophet. Perhaps it is not
surprising that a European scholar was the first to reveal the fallacy of his predic-
tion—and to show just how exceptional America was.
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II
A small volume by the German social scientist Werner Sombart, would become the
point of entry for many seeking to deal with a post-frontier America: “Warum gibt es
in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus?” At the time Sombart wrote in 1906,
socialist parties in France and Germany were powerful; the Labour party was begin-
ning to emerge in Britain. Marxists and those influenced by Marx (Sombart among
them) envisioned an increasingly immiserated proletariat, rising class consciousness,
and an imminent socialist revolution. The scenario seemed plausible for Europe. But
the United States, already the world’s greatest industrial power and presumably the
one that should be farthest along the road to that revolution, had the least significant
socialist movement in the world.
Sombart’s most quoted conclusion was a materialist one: Socialism in America had
foundered on “shoals of roast beef and apple pie.” He might also have cited better
housing. In 1917, Leon Trotsky briefly lived in New York City with his family. Their
apartment, he wrote, was in a “workers district” and was “equipped with all sorts of
conveniences that we Europeans were quite unused to: electric lights, gas cooking
range, bath, telephone, automatic service elevator, and even a chute for the garbage.”
Luxury could not deter Trotsky from his historic destiny. But did a high cholesterol
diet and good apartments block American socialism?
Selig Perlman, an economist and historian of the labor movement in the early part of
the twentieth century, clarified the picture when he asserted that American workers
(like Americans in general) were “property-conscious.” In America, the home-
owning worker was common. In Europe, he was far harder to find. The propertied
worker was even less likely than the tenant of an apartment with a garbage chute to
be a revolutionary.
The workers could vote, too. So could most common people. By and large, from the
founding of the American republic in 1776 workers, small farmers, and other less
than middle-class types were full citizens. Restrictive property qualifications for
voting or holding office differed from locality to locality, but they were generally
modest and disappeared in America well before they did in Europe. In general,
American workers did not have to struggle for full citizenship as did their counterp-
arts in every significant European nation.
III
Sombart, Perlman, and other pioneers in the “Why is there no socialism?” inquiry
asked their questions at a time when the American working class was distinct from
the middle class and when there was some rough resemblance between European and
American social hierarchies. By the mid-twentieth century, that resemblance had
disappeared. In the 1950s, an impoverished Western Europe was still recovering from
the devastation of the Second World War. There, socialism still seemed a mighty
political force. But Americans, working-class and otherwise, were prospering as never
before, moving to split-level three-bedroom homes in suburbs, and driving to work
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in monstrous automobiles. A new and obvious contrast between the United States
and Europe was emerging. (In 1949, per capita income in the United States was
$1453, in the United Kingdom, $723, in the Netherlands, $502.)  It was by no means
clear that these truly glaring contrasts were temporary.
By then, American history was at another critical turning point—the ten year “crucial
decade” after the end of the war in which the United States completed its transition
from inward-looking isolationist nation to hegemonic great power with worldwide
interests. For the American intelligentsia it seemed once again imperative to relate
the American experience to that of the rest of the world.
David Potter’s People of Plenty (1954) would argue that material abundance long had
set America apart from the rest of the world. In a sense, Potter restated the discover-
ers’ myth of America as a land of opportunity based on vast natural resources and
huge tracts of fertile soil. He systematically related the fact of abundance to
American social mobility, political democracy, and the nation’s sense of a larger mis-
sion in the world. Moreover, he shrewdly argued that it was an underlying assump-
tion of Turner’s frontier thesis. A brilliant and earnest scholar, Potter was also a mid-
twentieth century social scientist who made no effort to conceal his sense that the
task of defining national character was problematic. His hedging left one longing for
Turner’s blithe certainties!  People of Plenty was justly admired when it was published;
today one wonders how much it actually is read.
IV
For three other important historians of the crucial decade, the struggle with the
Soviet Union—a struggle that seemed driven by ideological issues—provided a more
obvious starting point than their nation’s prosperity. Their work explored the rela-
tionship between ideas and politics, rejected revolutionary ideology, and discovered
an American nation remarkably united in its core values.
Richard Hofstadter, surely the most important American historian of the last half of
the twentieth century, struck first in his classic book, The American Political Tradition
and the Men Who Made It (1948). American political leaders from the Founding
Fathers through Franklin Roosevelt, he argued in a vigorous introductory essay, had
shared the values of individualistic capitalism and conducted their conflicts within
that large consensus. The battles of American history, so large and divisive in the
minds of most scholars, needed to be understood as noisy spats between big capita-
lists and small capitalists. A former Marxist who still thought of himself as a radical,
Hofstadter wrote the introduction as an afterthought at the behest of his editor. It
reflected his disenchantment with the limited possibilities for change in American
life, but its insights were never fully and consistently developed.
Daniel J. Boorstin’s The Genius of American Politics (1953) attacked the problem in
head-on fashion. Another recovering Marxist, Boorstin had come away from his
encounter with Communism harboring a generalized revulsion against all-encompas-
sing ideologies. Far more sharply than other scholars of American exceptionalism, he
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attacked “Europe” in scathing terms as the birthplace of Nazism, fascism, and com-
munism. Telling Europe that America had nothing to learn from it, he then declared
that America had nothing to teach it: “To understand the uniqueness of American
history is to begin to understand why no adequate theory of our political life can be
written. It will also help us to see why our institutions cannot be transplanted to
other parts of the world.”
An explicit American political theory, Boorstin explained, was unnecessary because
the nation had a satisfactory equivalent. He coined a new term, “givenness”—“the
belief that values in America are in some way or other automatically defined: given by
certain facts of geography or history peculiar to us.” (9) These in turn provided a con-
tinuity of historical experience in sharp contrast to that of a Europe that had endured
two millennia of violent upheavals.
Thus, the great glory of American political thought was that none existed—at least
not at the level of first principles. America was successful because it had no ideology.
One’s first task in dealing with The Genius of American Politics is to get past the
concept of “givenness,” at once hopelessly mystical, empirically mushy, and crassly
anti-intellectual. That, however, would require wandering through various twisting
alleys of epistemology and ontology, a process far more dangerous to my health and
reputation than an after-midnight walk through New York’s Central Park. So I am
simply going to dismiss it as an unnecessary diversion.
What made Boorstin’s argument worth confronting was his assertion of a broad his-
torical consensus against ideology through the entire sweep of American history. Yet
if the term “ideology” meant anything other than the most elaborately developed
social theories, it surely encompassed values articulately expressed as ideas. Boorstin
was increasingly unconvincing as he applied his thesis to the most unlikely of sub-
jects—the Puritans, a group obsessed with applying Calvinist theological doctrine to
all aspects of life; the American Revolution, motivated by an explicit, elaborately arti-
culated theory of individual rights; and the American Civil War, which surely had
something to do with issues of race and natural rights. On the last topic, it may be
sufficient to recall Richard Hofstadter’s commentary: Imagining surviving Union and
Confederate soldiers looking out over a battlefield populated with corpses and the
terribly wounded as far as the eye could see, he has them saying to each other:
“Thank God, we had no fundamental disagreements.”
In later books, Boorstin argued convincingly that Americans were a uniquely practical
and problem-solving people, natural pragmatists in the popular sense of the word. Let
us thank him for developing this insight and forgive him for inventing “givenness.” No
one of note has attempted to further develop his argument about the lack of ideas in
American life. Rather the arguments have been about just what sort of ideas.
V
That task was left to Louis Hartz, a political scientist with a primary interest in politi-
cal thought and culture. His The Liberal Tradition in America (1955) was the last and
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most influential statement of American exceptionalism during the crucial decade.
Hartz argued that the history of the United States needed to be understood as occur-
ring almost entirely within the tradition of modern liberalism—in the broad sense of
an emphasis on the individual as the basic unit of history and naturally entitled to
fundamental liberties. Liberalism thus understood, Hartz declared, had been most
prominently represented in American history by the English philosopher John Locke.
Locke’s name became Hartz’s semi-mystical shorthand for the determining force in
American history. Hartz’s view of the conflicts in American history as being mainly
between Whigs and democrats was congruent with Hofstadter’s sense of a continuing
fuss among capitalists. Hartz agreed with Boorstin that America’s experience and
political values were too distinctive to be readily exportable.
Hartz’s main reference point was, of course, Europe, seen in the grand tradition of
American exceptionalism as a continent with a long and dark history of truly funda-
mental conflict. When Hartz wrote, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were recent
memories; Eastern Europe was under Soviet control; Franco ruled in Spain; Greece,
barely removed from its civil war, was bitterly divided; France and Italy had large,
noisy Communist parties. Clearly, the range of ideologies was much larger than in the
United States and the sentiments behind them more explosive.
Why had Americans been spared all this?  Why was “Locke” dominant in the United
States, but not in Europe?  Hartz cited the preeminent foreign interpreter of
American civilization, Alexis de Tocqueville, who observed that Americans had been
“born free”; they had settled a wilderness in which it was possible to begin a new
society without the impediments of an old one. American history had begun without
an entrenched feudal system in place, no decaying ancien regime to overthrow in a
bloody social upheaval, no reactionary remnants to struggle for a restoration, no cen-
turies of rigid and immobile class distinctions.
Moving relentlessly through American history, one chronological era after another,
Hartz found “Locke,” and liberalism. From time to time, he also threw in someone
named “Alger”—a reference to the 19th century American writer Horatio Alger and his
protagonists—ambitious, hard-working young men who seized chances offered to
them and moved up in the world. “Alger” was a clear reference to the Calvinist pre-
sence in American thought. Perhaps because he preferred a more secular figure, Hartz
said little about Calvinism. Yet from the days of the Pilgrim and Puritan settlers,
Calvinist ideas had occupied a primary role in American culture.
Calvinism’s tendency to connect virtue and salvation with worldly success encouraged
the development of capitalism. Its skepticism about human nature led naturally to a
suspicion of unlimited power. Its emphasis upon a contractual relationship between
man and God led naturally to an assumption of contractual relationships in all
aspects of human life, including the relationship between rulers and ruled. (Locke
himself was attracted to Calvinism’s liberal elements while repelled by its frequently
authoritarian practices. The point of convergence, was powerful and apparent—the
centrality of the social contract.)  Calvinism was clearly the dominant strain of
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American religious thought during the three centuries after the earliest settlements.
Writing in the tradition of Hartz, John Patrick Diggins has persuasively argued that
the American liberal tradition has two icons—Calvin and Locke.
The major problem with the Hartz-Diggins paradigm is its implication that American
history can be abstracted as political philosophy. It has great allegorical value but
insufficient tangible connection to the wide range of experiences that go into the for-
mation of a national character. It is here that we might return to Turner’s “frontier”
and  those consecutive waves of settlement that reenact the social contract through
much of American history, creating opportunities for those ready to take risks in a
new setting. Here also, we might note David Potter’s observation that American
abundance was not just there for the taking. It was created by “the ventures and
struggles of the pioneer, the exertions of the workman, the ingenuity of the inventor,
the drive of the enterpriser, and the economic efficiency of all kinds of Americans,
who shared a notorious addiction to hard work.”(89)   The different representations
of American exceptionalism in fact all have considerable compatibility with each
other. To a large extent, they are the work of sight-impaired scholars groping at the
contours of an elephant.
VI
Have we vindicated the idea of American exceptionalism?  
Writing on the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States, Britain, and
Germany, I did not find “American exceptionalism” to be a very useful concept. Some
large, general differences between the US and Europe existed, but they were oversha-
dowed by vital national differences. Most obviously, the contrasts between the core
values of British and German political cultures were enormous. One was a liberal
democracy that sought consensus in hard times, the other a bitterly divided authori-
tarian culture that embraced Nazi totalitarianism. Britain and the United States, on
the other hand, possessed common bedrock commitments that made distinctions in
institutions and styles of leadership seem trivial by comparison. Stanley Baldwin,
Neville Chamberlain, and Franklin Roosevelt had far more in common with each
other than Baldwin and Chamberlain had with Hitler. The electorates that went to
the polls in 1935 to return Baldwin and Chamberlain and in 1936 to return Roosevelt
did so in a political world of shared values far different than those of the Germans
who voted for Hitler’s plebiscites.
This perhaps brings us to the other side of the coin—the difficulty of generalizing
about “Europe.” Long ago, those people trying to make use of the Hartzian formula
realized that there was a significant distinction in degrees of liberalism among the
nations of Europe, running roughly in declining strength from the North and West to
the South and East. But I wonder if we can get by simply by talking about differences
in degree. Have there been exceptional nations in Europe?  
Shortly before leaving the United States to take up this chair, I spent some time
leafing through one of the great works of nineteenth-century American historical
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writing, John Lothrop Motley’s The Rise of the Dutch Republic. However outdated
Motley may seem to us today, his work is not without its insights. Motley’s grand
narrative concludes with the relief of the Spanish siege of Leiden and the triumphal
founding of this university. It takes a moment for an Anglocentric historian to realize
that these events predated the English defeat of the Spanish armada by more than a
dozen years and the founding of the Virginia colony in America by a generation. The
initial Dutch defeat of Spanish despotism, Motley asserts, was the seminal event in a
long historical process that led to parliamentary government in England, to the
American Revolution, and to other triumphs of liberty in the Western world.
The early Dutch nation clearly stood in sharp contrast to the rest of continental Europe
as an incubator of liberalism in the early modern era. It extended a large degree of tole-
rance to the Catholicism it had defeated. It harbored the heretical Jewish pantheist
Baruch Spinoza, who must have been even more repugnant to the Calvinist establish-
ment. It provided refuge not only to John Robinson and his Pilgrims, but also to John
Locke for five critical years. And when England had its liberal revolution, Holland pro-
vided it with a new king and queen. I will leave the issue of Dutch exceptionalism to
colleagues who know far more than I, but I find Motley’s argument attractive.
There is some remaining validity, to the idea of American exceptionalism. The range
of ideological politics in America is still considerably narrower than in most
European countries. The authority of the state, ruling elites, and bureaucracies is
more constrained, the breadth of opportunities greater, the median standard of living
still generally richer.
That said, the problem lacks contemporary immediacy. The nations of the Western
world are now more alike than they ever have been in their unprecedented widespread
affluence, social mobility, and embrace of liberal democracy. Yet huge gaps of percep-
tion remain, and we still find much to quarrel about. Today, perhaps it is many
Europeans who are innocent, who seem prone to think that we have reached the end of
history and the ultimate triumph of secular, rationalist liberalism. History goes on.
Sooner or later, we learn that it happens to all of us. We all, I submit, need to realize the
commonality of our core values and common perils in this still-treacherous world.
It is appropriate at this point to express my gratitude to Mr. and Mrs. Raymond
Sackler for their generosity in endowing this chair that I am privileged to hold; to
thank the Board of Leiden University and the Professors of the Department of
History for selecting me as the first occupant of this very special position; to thank
my valued colleagues for their warm welcome and hospitality, and to give special
thanks to my wife Joyce for sharing 37 years of my journey through life. Among my
mentors I must give special recognition to three remarkable scholars and great
friends: John A. Garraty, Richard S. Kirkendall, and William E. Leuchtenburg.
To those of you officially classified as students, I say that we are all students, whether
we have been at it for one year or fifty. And I ask you always to remember that it is
history that tells who we are and what we should try to be.
Ik heb gezegd!
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